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reasonable, especially inasmuch as it did not appear that discrimination between the peddling which was useful, and that which was
harmful, was impractical. In so holding, the Court of Appeals has
extended the doctrine that peddling, unless it constitute an interference
with traffic, 7 cannot be prohibited by a municipal ordinance. It has
been held that a city cannot by ordinance prohibit peddling in certain
sections thereof when conditions in the restricted section are not
dissimilar from those existing in many other areas and where the
ordinance bears no relation to the welfare of the public but is designed
for the convenience and interest of a special class.8 Hawking and
peddling have long been subject to regulation. 9 As such, the city
of New York had the right to impose reasonable and just regulations,
but did not have the right to impose a broad prohibition on a legitimate business. Moreover, the city of New York did not have the
power to prohibit peddling as an incidental right of its power over
the use of the streets granted it by the Home Rule Law, Section 11.
Three justices in a dissenting opinion written by Finch, J., contended that the Local Law was a reasonable regulation of a purely
local problem and therefore constitutional. The minority view was
that the Local Law did not force the peddlers and hawkers to abandon
their trade but rather to confine themselves to the public markets
where adequate facilities had been provided.' The use of the facilities
in the public market would result in proper supervision both as to
the safeguarding of food and as to short weighting and other problems
which at present are difficult to enforce. The decision in the principal case is an affirmation of the rule that peddling is a legitimate
business and is subject to regulation but not prohibition.
T.K.

INSURANCE-TRUST

AGREEMENTS-USE

OF

ACCUMULATION

PRIOR TO AGREED TIME.-Widowed mother of three children seeks
to have an alleged trust agreement set aside, so that interest being
accumulated for three minor children may be used to pay for the
children's education. Petitioner's husband was insured by five lifeinsurance companies. By the terms of the policies, the benefits
accruing on the death of the insured would be divided equally among
decedent's three minor children. The rights of the beneficiaries were
7 Bus Depot Holding Corp. v. Valentine, 288 N. Y. 115, 41 N. E. (2d)
913 (1942).
8 People v. Cohen, 272 N. Y. 319, 5 N. E. (2d) 835 (1936) ; People v.
Klinge, 276 N. Y. 292, 12 N. E. (2d) 161 (1938).

9 N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 26, § 20, subd. 13. Subject to the constitution and
general laws of this state, every city is empowered to maintain order, enforce
the laws, protect property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort
and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors thereto; and for
any of said purposes to regulate and license occupations and businesses.
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evidenced by so-called certificates of deposit, or trust agreements.
Two of the insurance companies agreed to hold the monies as
"trustees." The income from the "trust" was to be accumulated
until the children reached the age of twenty-one, when the interest
then accrued was to be paid in one lump sum. Future interest was
to be paid in stated installments. In the event one of the beneficiaries
would die before reaching the age of thirty years, the benefits were
to be paid to the survivor or survivors, and then to the estate of
insured. Decedent's widow, general guardian of two of the infant
beneficiaries, now alleges that she is without funds to support the
two children, and prays that the insurance companies be directed to
pay over to her suitable sums from the accumulated income to support
the children and provide for their education. Held, petition denied.
In re Nires, 290 N. Y. 78, 48 N. E. (2d) 268 (1943).
Section 17 of the New York Personal Property Law gives
authority to the Supreme Court to invade trust agreements where
there is an accumulation of income for the benefit of minors, where
those charged with support of the children are not able to do so. The
court may direct so much of the accumulated interest be paid over
to the guardian as may be necessary for the children's support.1
However, here there is no trust within the meaning of this statute.
The accumulation of income is not a result of a direction by the
grantor. The accumulation is the result of a contractual agreement
between the grantor and the insurance companies, and there is no
trust, but a debt.2 Nor is there a res from which the income must
be paid, as is the case in a trust, but the interest is of a fixed rate,
regardless of the earnings of the company. Further, Section 15 of
the New York Personal Property Law provides that payments
such as those involved here, may not be changed by the courtsO The
mere fact that there is an accumulation of interest does not justify
1 N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 17. "When a minor, for whose benefit
a valid accumulation of the income of personal property has been directed, shall
be destitute of other sufficient means of support or education, the supreme
court, at special term in any case, or, if such accumulation shall have been
directed by a will, the surrogate's court of the county in which such will shall
have been admitted to probate, may, on the application of such minor or guardian, cause a suitable sum to be taken from the moneys accumulated or directed
to be accumulated, to be applied for the support or education of such minor."
Matter of King, 121 Misc. 298, 200 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1923) ; Matter of
Wagner, 81 App. Div. 163, 80 N. Y. Supp. 785 (1903).
2 Holmes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 288 N.'Y. 106, 41 N. F_
(2d) 909 (1942); Latterman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 280 N. Y. 102, 19 N. E.
(2d) 978 (1939); Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934).
3 N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 15. ". . . . Provided, however, that
when the proceeds of a life insurance policy, becoming a claim by the death of
the insured, are left with the insurance company under a trust or other agreement, the benefits accruing thereunder after the death of the insured shall not
be ... subject to commutation or incumbrance, nor to legal process except in
an action to recover for necessaries .

. . ."

(Emphasis supplied.)

Crossman v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934).
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the court's invasion of the contract. 4 The right of the court under
Section 17 seems to be based on inherent equity powers to regulate
trusts, and this power.is expressly forbidden to
5 be exercised as against
such accumulations in policies of insurance.
F.G.

WAR-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-Plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant, the Alien Property Custodian under Section 9a of
the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, 1 to recover
its property that was seized and was being liquidated by the defendant.
Plaintiff made a motion for an order directing defendant to retain
in his custody until final judgment the property seized and to permit
the plaintiff to carry on its business. The defendant countered with
a motion to dismiss the entire complaint on the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction over this seizure andthat the defendant
has determined that the plaintiff corporation and its president were
nationals of a designated enemy country and cloaking for German
interests in Germany and that the interests of the United States
require the liquidation of the corporation. Held, motion to dismiss
the complaint denied. The court has jurisdiction over all seizures
under the Trading With the Enemy Act so long as the plaintiff
is not an "enemy" or "ally of enemy" within the meaning of those
terms in the Act. 2 Defendant shall not liquidate the corporation or
sell the stock until it is deqided whether the plaintiffs are "nationals
of a designated enemy country." Draeger Shipping Co. Inc. et al. v.
Crowley, Alien Property Custodian, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y.
1943).

4 Pierowich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich. 118, 275 N. W. 789
(1937).
5
In re Howland, 37 Misc. 114, 74 N. Y. Supp. 950 (1902),rev'd on other
grounds, 75 App. Div. 207, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1902); Matter of Muller,
29 Hun 418 (N. Y. 1883); Matter of Kane, 2 Barb. Ch. 375 (N. Y. 1847);
Matter of Bostwick, 4 Johns. Ch. 100 (N. Y. 1819).
See N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.
140 STAT. 411, 50 U. S. C. A. App. (1917).
2 40 STAT. 411, § 9 (1917), permits suit to review seizure by the Alien
Property Custodian but does not allow one who is an enemy or ally of an enemy
to bring suit. Id. § 2, defines an enemy as: "(a) Any individual, partnership, or
other body of individuals of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the
United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business
within such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of
any nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any
country other than the United States and doing business within such territory."
The phrase "ally of enemy" has a similar definition with reference: to nations
which are allies of nations with which the United States is at war.

